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Grandparents' Custody Rights
Michelle Ognibenet
Grandparents occupy a unique position in both families and the
broader community. They serve as repositories of tradition, as babysit-
ters, or as parent surrogates where parents are unable or unwilling to
care for their children. Despite the benefits that grandparent care of-
fers, many state adoption statutes do not require preference or notice
for grandparents in custody proceedings. This imbalance in the statu-
tory framework often puts grandparents at a disadvantage when com-
peting against foster parents or state officials who wish to put the
child into foster care.
Because adoption by strangers to the family severs the child's ties
to his natural family, adoption proceedings may destroy grandparents'
ability to interact with their grandchildren. Given the grave conse-
quences of adoption outside the family for grandparent-grandchild
relationships, this Comment argues that grandparents' recognized
constitutional right to participate in their grandchildren's upbringing
also allows grandparents to direct that upbringing. Specifically, grand-
parents have a constitutional right to both preference and notice in
custody proceedings. Although adoption ultimately turns on a deter-
mination of the child's best interests,3 a failure to notify grandparents
adequately or to prefer their petitions, where doing so would not be
contrary to the child's interests, ought to be regarded as a violation of
the grandparents' right to due process.
In reaching this conclusion, the Comment first examines current
state laws that illustrate a policy preference for grandparent or kinship
t B.S.F.S. 2003, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
1 See notes 8-9. In contrast, some states offer foster parents a preference under certain
circumstances. See, for example, Tenn Code Ann § 36-1-115(g)(1) (2001) (granting first prefer-
ence in adoption proceedings to foster parents who have cared for a child for a year or more);
Conn Gen Stat Ann § 52-466(f) (West 1991) (granting standing to foster parents, but not grand-
parents, to bring a writ of habeas corpus to return a child to their custody).
2 See Johnson v City of Cincinnati, 310 F3d 484,501 (6th Cir 2002) (holding that a grand-
mother with a prior history of active participation in her granddaughters' lives has a fundamen-
tal right to freely associate with and participate in the upbringing of her grandchildren); Drollin-
ger v Milligan, 552 F2d 1220, 1227 (7th Cir 1977) (holding that a grandfather has a fundamental
right to participate in caring for his granddaughter).
3 See Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255 (1978) ("[Tlhe State was required in this situa-
tion to find ... that the adoption ... [was] in the 'best interests of the child."').
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care, and yet contain few concrete safeguards for grandparents' inter-
ests in the custody context. Part I also addresses the basis for asserting
that the grandparent-grandchild relationship is a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part
II analyzes potential obstacles to finding a protected liberty interest
for grandparents and shows that the recent case of Troxel 
v Granville4
does not pose a threat to grandparents' rights in the custody context.
In Troxel, the Court struck down a statute that allowed grandparents
and others to obtain court-ordered visitation where a parent denied ac-
cess to the child.The Court's core reason for striking down the statute
in that case, however, was that the statute ignored the traditional pre-
sumption that fit parents will act in the child's best interests and re-
quired parents to demonstrate that the visitation would be contrary to
the child's interests. 6 Custody proceedings typically are predicated on
the termination of parental rights; where parents are no longer in the
picture, Troxel need not serve as a constraint on grandparental rights.
Part III discusses the possible bases for claiming that, in the ab-
sence of parents and subject to the child's best interests, grandparents
have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining familial integrity
and the right to shape their grandchild's upbringing. This Part exam-
ines other instances in which custody and parental rights have been
afforded due process protection and draws an analogy between the
rights of grandparents and those of unwed fathers. Finally, the Com-
ment examines the consequences of recognizing such a liberty interest
for grandparents, and the procedural and substantive safeguards that
could ensure its protection.
I. GRANDPARENTS' CUSTODY RIGHTS UNDER CURRENT LAW
A. The Statutory Background
Many state statutes contain a preference for grants of custody to
those who would likely have the closest emotional ties to the child.7 This
4 530 US 57 (2000).
5 Id at 67 (holding that a Washington statute allowing the court to grant visitation orders
to any person, including grandparents, unconstitutionally infringed on parents' rights to control
the upbringing of their children).
6 Id at 69.
7 See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care and
Kinship Care, in Naomi R. Cahn and Joan Heifetz Hollinger, eds, Families by Law: An Adoption
Reader 111-12 (NYU 2004) (describing the trend towards placement within the family and the
rapid growth of kinship foster care nationwide). Some examples of state statutes illustrating this
preference towards kinship foster care include: Ark Code Ann § 9-9-102(a) (Michie 2002) (pro-
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policy preference, however, seldom gives grandparents the same pro-
cedural guarantees as those that parents enjoy in custody proceed-
ings.8 Generally, state law does not require petitioners for adoption to
notify grandparents of adoption proceedings, nor does it require grand-
parents' consent Courts may even deny grandparents the right to
intervene in parental rights termination proceedings, potentially allow-
ing the state to take custody of the child without affording the grand-
parents an opportunity to express their preferences or offer an alterna-
tive home for the child.' ° This result appears particularly harsh in light
viding that in foster care placements, "preferential consideration shall be given to an adult rela-
tive over a nonrelated caregiver"); NJ Stat Ann § 30:4C-12.1a (West 1997) ("In any case in which
the Division of Youth and Family Services accepts a child in its care or custody ... the division
shall initiate a search for relatives who may be willing and able to provide the care and support
required by the child."); 10 Okla Stat Ann § 7210A (West 1998) (requiring that child-placing
agencies "make special efforts to recruit foster placement for children in their custody from
suitable relatives and kin of the child"); Va Code Ann § 16.1-283 (Michie 2004) (providing that
after termination of parental rights, "the court shall give a consideration to granting custody to
relatives of the child, including grandparents.").
8 See Roberta Kotkin, Note, Grandparents Versus the State: A Constitutional Right to
Custody, 13 Hofstra L Rev 375 (1985), for a discussion of the heavy procedural burden placed on
grandparents under New York law, which denies grandparents a preferential status in custody
determinations. See also Navajo Nation v Superior Court, 47 F Supp 2d 1233, 1238 (ED Wash
1999) (describing the notice provisions in the Indian Child Welfare Act as requiring notice only
to the parent, Indian custodian, or tribe for involuntary parental rights termination proceedings);
Gonzalez v State Department of Children's Services, 136 SW3d 613, 618-19 (Tenn 2004) ("In the
majority of cases, [ ] grandparents are not allowed to intervene in [parental rights] termination
cases . .. because they are deemed to have no interest in the outcome of the proceedings.");
Graham v Children's Services Division, 39 Or App 27, 591 P2d 375, 379 (1979) (holding that
grandparents, who previously had custody of their grandchildren, did not have an interest suffi-
cient to entitle them to an adversarial hearing before the agency could withhold its consent to
the grandparents' adoption of their grandchildren). Compare these cases with Stanley v Illinois,
405 US 645, 657-58 (1972), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires the state to give a natural parent a hearing on his parental fitness before the state
may take his child into custody.
9 See, for example, In re Adoption of Watson, 45 Hawaii 69, 361 P2d 1054, 1056, 1060
(1961) (holding that a grandfather was not entitled to notice of adoption, was not entitled to be
made party to the adoption, and did not have standing to appeal the adoption decree). See also
Gordon v Lowell, 95 F Supp 2d 264,271 (ED Pa 2000) (holding that grandparents lacked stand-
ing to petition for custody because Pennsylvania law only confers standing if the child has re-
sided with his grandparents for twelve months or more); Navajo Nation, 47 F Supp 2d at 1238
(stating that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not require notice to grandparents in involuntary
parental rights termination proceedings).
10 Kristen Jones Indermark, Note, Permissive Intervention-Grandparents' Key to Entering
Adoption Proceedings, 26 Ga L Rev 787, 788 n 6, 819 n 124 (1992) (providing examples of situa-
tions in which courts dismissed grandparents' petitions to intervene in adoption proceedings on
the grounds that they had no legal interest in their relationship with the child). See also Gonzalez,
136 SW3d at 618-19 (stating that courts often deny grandparents a right to intervene in termina-
tion cases because grandparents' interest in the proceedings is either adequately secured by the
parents' attorney or the grandparents have no cognizable interest in the outcome); Kasper v
Nordfelt, 815 P2d 747, 749 (Utah App 1991) (denying grandparents' intervention petition be-
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of the fact that adoption can mean the end of the grandparents' rela-
tionship with the child." Several courts, condemning these results, have
required notice to grandparents of adoption hearings because of their
interest in the proceedings.2
Once the child has been removed from his family, his grandpar-
ents' ability to petition for his adoption can be significantly inhibited
by a lack of notice of custody proceedings, competing adoption peti-
tions, or any sort of deference to the parent-like roles and obligations
that grandparents often assume. Despite evidence of a policy prefer-
ence in many states for kinship care over foster care,'3 grandparents still
may be at a disadvantage in adoption competitions with foster parents.
By explicitly preferring foster parents and strangers to the family, as at
least one state does, and by failing to require notice or a hearing for
cause they had no legally cognizable interest in the child of their deceased son); Department of
Human Resources v Ledbetter, 153 Ga App 416, 265 SE2d 337, 339 (1980) (denying the right to
intervene to a great-aunt and great-uncle, who acted as grandparents to the child, because they
did not possess a legal interest in their relationship with the child).
11 Some state statutes extinguish the rights of grandparents to visit their grandchildren if a
nonrelative adopts the child. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann § 257.C08(5) (West 2003). See also
Gordon, 95 F Supp 2d at 270 (noting that Pennsylvania law extinguishes any visitation rights of
grandparents once a child is adopted); In re Adoption of Tompkins, 341 Ark 949, 20 SW3d 385,
387 (2000) (noting that an adoption by foster parents would extinguish court-ordered grandpar-
ent visitation rights).
12 See In re Adoption of LK.E. W., 724 NE2d 245, 250-51 (Ind App 2000) (holding that
although the grandparents had no due process rights with respect to the adoption of their grand-
child, they were entitled to notice of the hearing on the foster parents' petition to adopt). Mis-
souri law grants grandparents a statutory right to intervene in certain custody proceedings. See
Mo Rev Stat § 211.177.1 ("A grandparent shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding...
in which the custody of a grandchild is in issue."); In re M.B., 91 SW3d 122,125 (Mo App 2002)
(noting that grandparents may intervene unless the court decides that intervention is "against
the best interest of the child"). This law, however, does not guarantee grandparents a right to
initiate a custody proceeding of their own. See Whisman v Rinehart, 119 F3d 1303, 1313 (8th Cir
1997). The limits of the rights guaranteed under the Missouri statute are further illustrated by In
re Adoption of H.M.C., 11 SW3d 81, 90 (Mo App 2000) (holding that, in custody proceedings
where the state's intervention statute did not apply, a grandparent's biological relationship to the
child was insufficient to constitute the necessary "interest" to require intervention under the rules
of civil procedure).
13 See note 7.
14 Tennessee disfavors adoption by relatives once the child has entered foster care by
allowing a preference for foster parent adoption when the child has resided with the foster par-
ents for twelve months or more. See Tenn Code Ann § 36-1-115(g)(1) (2001). Additionally, the
same statute restricts relative adoptions to those relatives that fulfill specific residency require-
ments. Tenn Code Ann § 36-1-115(d) (2001). Connecticut has similarly conferred standing on
foster parents to seek return of a child to their custody by a writ of habeas corpus, Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 52-466, while denying standing to grandparents in In re Kristy L., 47 Conn Supp 273,
787 A2d 679,685-87 (Super Ct 1999). See also Cal Family Code § 3040(a)(2) (West 2004) (stating
that in custody disputes preference should be given to any person "in whose home the child has
been living in a wholesome and stable environment" if not to the parents).
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grandparents, adoption and custody statutes may unduly interfere
with any rights grandparents may have to direct the upbringing of
their grandchildren. The next Part discusses whether the Constitution
entitles grandparents to such rights.
B. Bases for Grandparents' Constitutional Rights
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
a promising basis for the assertion of greater rights for grandparents
in the custody context." Although there is no fundamental "right to
adopt,"'" grandparents, much like parents, may have a fundamental
liberty interest in familial integrity and the companionship of their
grandchildren. Part I.B.1 analyzes the bases on which the courts have
found constitutional protection for family matters, and the ways in
which those theories can extend to grandparents. This Part addresses
how grandparents may stand in the shoes of parents, and how the law
has recognized the similarities between the grandparent-grandchild
and parent-child relationships.
Part I.B.2 addresses possible obstacles facing the extension of es-
tablished fundamental rights in the context of the nuclear family to
the situation of grandparents. Troxel's reaffirmation of parental
autonomy as a fundamental liberty interest, at the expense of grand-
parents' visitation rights, is one such obstacle. A careful analysis of the
differences between the visitation and adoption contexts reveals, how-
ever, that grandparents can receive preference and notice in adoption
proceedings without infringing on parents' rights. Where parents'
rights have been terminated, as is necessary for adoption, the conflict
between the interests of grandparents and parents is absent.
1. Freedom of intimate association.
To assert constitutional protection for the grandparent-grandchild
relationship, grandparents must demonstrate that their relationships
are so intimate and essential that they fall within the Fourteenth
15 For a similar discussion of this issue prior to recent developments in the case law, see
Kotkin, Note, 13 Hofstra L Rev 375 (cited in note 8).
16 See Lofton v Department of Children & Family Services, 358 F3d 804, 811-12 (11th Cir
2004) (stating that there is no fundamental right to adopt in holding that a state may constitu-
tionally prohibit adoption by homosexuals), cert denied, 125 S Ct 869 (2005), citing Mullins v
Oregon, 57 F3d 789, 794 (9th Cir 1995); Lindley v Sullivan, 889 F2d 124, 131 (7th Cir 1989). See
also Griffith v Johnston, 899 F2d 1427,1437 (5th Cir 1990) ("[Wle cannot recognize a 'fundamen-
tal right' to adopt a child.").
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Amendment's protection of "liberty." 7 One promising argument for
this protection is that the grandparent-grandchild relationship is pro-
tected by the "freedom of intimate association." Unlike the freedom
of expressive association protected by the First Amendment, the free-
dom of intimate association has been recognized as an unenumerated
right grounded in the Due Process Clause."8 This right protects relation-
ships that play an important role in our culture by transmitting values
and serving as a "buffer" between the state and the individual." "Free-
dom of intimate association" protects a variety of personal bonds, such
as the right to marry ° and the right to determine family living ar-
rangements.2 These emotional bonds are generally of great value to
individuals and to society. Protection of these bonds from state inter-
ference allows individuals to define their own identities -perhaps the
fundamental meaning of "liberty.""
Courts consider many factors when assessing whether a relation-
ship falls under the right to freedom of intimate association. These
factors include the existence of a deep emotional attachment, shared
experiences and beliefs, and other intangible factors that set the indi-
viduals sharing the relationship apart from the rest of the community."
Biology is of minor importance. Deep emotional attachments tend to
follow from common biological ties due to a greater chance of prox-
17 See Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 571 (1972) (examining the
"nature of the interest at stake" to determine if it is a protected liberty interest subject to due
process requirements) (emphasis added).
18 See Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 618-19 (1984) (describing the rationale
for constitutional protection of intimate relationships).
19 See id.
20 See Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 384-86 (1978) (noting that the right to marry is
protected by the right of privacy).
21 See Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503-06 (1977) (Powell) (plurality)
(finding that a city cannot force families to live in "narrowly defined [] patterns").
22 See Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 258 (1983) (explaining that a "relationship of love
and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protec-
tion"). See also Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255 (1978) (recognizing protection of parent-
child relationships and its basis in the emotional ties characterizing them); Smith v Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 844 (1977) (recognizing the importance
of the emotional bonds cementing familial relationships); Cleveland Board of Education v LaF-
leur, 414 US 632, 639-40 (1974) (recognizing the protection of "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life"); Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645,651-52 (1972) (emphasizing
the fundamental nature of a father's interest in caring for his children).
23 See Roberts, 468 US at 619-20 ("Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares ...
distinctively personal aspects of one's life.").
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imity or familiarity, but the emotional rather than the biological aspect
of the relationship is the basis of the protection.4
2. The right to parental autonomy.
Although related to the freedom of intimate association, another
line of cases has established that parents have a right to exclusive con-
trol over decisions pertaining to their children. Parent-child relation-
ships enjoy extensive protection from state interference in matters
ranging from the child's education" to choice of religion.26 Courts re-
gard these rights as "far more precious" than the property rights gen-
erally protected by due process.V Parental rights directly influence
parents' ability to control the child's values and prepare her for future
involvement in society.s Although courts have repeatedly reaffirmed
parents' virtually unfettered authority over their children, parents'
substantive rights to custody and control may be subordinate to the
state's interest in the child's welfare in cases of abuse or neglect.29 In
this way the "best interests of the child" can override parents' right to
autonomy in making decisions regarding their children.'
24 See Smith, 431 US at 844 ("No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the
absence of a blood relationship.").
25 See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 400 (1923) (holding that a teacher's "right []to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children ... are within the liberty
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."). See also Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510,534-35 (1925)
(invalidating a state statute that unreasonably interfered with parents' liberty to direct their
children's education and upbringing).
26 See Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205,213-14 (1972) ("[T]he values of parental direction of
the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a
high place in our society.").
27 May v Anderson, 345 US 528,533 (1953).
28 See Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166 (1944) (finding that "the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"). The Supreme Court re-
cently reaffirmed parents' freedom to determine the upbringing of their children by invalidating
a statute allowing grandparents and others to receive court ordered visitation rights without the
parents' consent. Troxel, 530 US at 67-69.
29 See note 3. See also In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 NJ Super 584, 277 A2d 566, 570
(1971) ("Although initially a natural parent has the right to custody, that right is secondary to the
concern of the State ... in promoting the child's welfare and best interests.").
30 See, for example, In re Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass 636, 745 NE2d 330, 342 (2001)
(explaining that the state did not infringe on a parent's constitutional rights by acting in its
parens patriae capacity to sever the parent-child relationship when severance was in the child's
best interests).
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3. Extension of rights to grandparents.
The interests of grandparents in their relationships with their
grandchildren bear many similarities to those of parents. Grandpar-
ents and parents generally share similar feelings of love and responsi-
bility for the child, and grandparents often assist parents in caring for
the child. These similarities demonstrate that the interests of grand-
parents deserve protection under the Due Process Clause as both im-
portant personal relationships and as an extension of parental auton-
omy rights.
The Supreme Court is generally reluctant to expand the range of
unenumerated rights protected by the Due Process Clause;3' however,
the extension of rights to grandparents is not a radical departure from
prior Supreme Court precedent. In certain situations, courts have rec-
ognized rights for grandparents under the freedom of intimate asso-
ciation, but the division between intimate association rights and rights
implicating parental autonomy often blurs. Both areas rest on similar
bases and traditions.3 In light of this, one could potentially interpret
the cases as implicitly recognizing parent-like autonomy where grand-
parents have assumed parent-like roles. This would allow grandpar-
ents to rely on the cases recognizing due process rights for unwed fa-
thers," making the argument for protection of parent-like grandpar-
ents less an expansion of substantive due process and more a revision
of the concept of "parents" in light of tradition and practice.
The Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to extend some
of the constitutional protection of the nuclear family to grandparent-
grandchild relationships. In Moore v City of East Cleveland, the
Court implicitly recognized that grandparents can occupy a position
much like that of parents, making their actions and wishes for their
grandchildren equally deserving of respect in the absence of parental
contest. The Court held that a local government could not impose a
zoning ordinance that restricted a grandmother's ability to live legally
with her grandchildren, recognizing that the grandmother had the right
to determine the composition of her household.3 In doing so, the
31 See generally Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997); Moore, 431 US at 502 (ac-
knowledging the risks of expanding the scope of substantive due process without the guidance of
more specific constitutional provisions).
32 See Parts I.B.1-2.
33 See Part III.
34 See note 122 for an explanation of the importance placed on tradition in finding protected
liberty interests under the substantive due process doctrine.
35 431 US 494 (1977).
36 Id at 503-04 (Powell) (plurality).
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Court reiterated its longstanding protection of the nuclear family, fur-
ther stating that the "tradition of... grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition." The Court further
implied that the right to live with grandchildren, undisturbed by state
authority, is a natural corollary to the right of family members to in-
culcate values, which itself serves as one of the cornerstones for the
protection of parental autonomy.
Several cases appear to cite Moore for the proposition that the
right of grandparents to live with their grandchildren is a fundamental
liberty interest of the same nature and type as that enjoyed by parents.
Most recently, in Johnson v City of Cincinnati,39 the Sixth Circuit in-
validated an exclusion notice that prohibited a grandmother who had
been convicted of marijuana trafficking from entering the locality where
her grandchildren resided, despite her established caregiving relation-
ship with them.'O Although the grandmother in Johnson did not live
with her grandchildren, 1 making her relationship with them slightly
less intimate than the relationship in Moore, the court deemed her
role in their lives equally worthy of constitutional protection. The
court described this right to participate in grandchild upbringing in
the language of freedom of intimate association, declaring that "a fam-
ily member's right to participate in child rearing and education is one
of the most basic and important associational rights protected by the
constitution."4 2 This decision expanded upon Moore, characterizing the
right as not a mere right to organize one's household and family living
arrangements as one sees fit, but as a fundamental right to participate
in the upbringing of grandchildren with whom grandparents have an
existing relationship (absent parental contest).4 The court determined
that "nothing in our tradition or precedent can credibly be read to
suggest that the right to participate in child rearing does not extend to
37 Id.
38 See id (discussing the principle of constitutional protection of the "sanctity of the fam-
ily," including grandparents and other relatives, because of its deep roots in history and tradition
and its key role in passing down moral and cultural values).
39 310 F3d 484 (6th Cir 2002).
40 Idat506.
41 Id at 489.
42 Id at 499. See also Drollinger v Milligan, 552 F2d 1220, 1227 (7th Cir 1977) ("This basic
interest in the integrity of the family unit has been afforded the protection of due process of law.").
43 Johnson, 310 F3d at 500-01 (finding that the grandmother had actively participated in
the lives of her grandchildren and holding that she had "a fundamental freedom of association
right to participate in the upbringing of her grandchildren").
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grandparents."" In this way, the court recognized that the constitu-
tional rights afforded to the family are not limited to the nuclear fam-
ily, but may extend to those who perform parent-like functions.'
Grandparents' interest in maintaining relationships with, and par-
ticipating in the upbringing of, their grandchildren has generally been
well-received by courts in the absence of a conflicting parental inter-
est." It seems natural to extend the holdings of these cases to afford
protection to grandparents wishing to direct the upbringing of their
grandchildren by adoption. A grandparent's rights may be qualified by
a fit parent's own exclusive control over his child, but where a parent
is absent or has no objection to the grandparent-grandchild relation-
ship, a grandparent should enjoy protections and presumptions similar
to those given to parents.
In summary, both the intimate aspects of grandparents' relation-
ships with their grandchildren and their traditional status as parent sur-
rogates provide substantial bases for finding that the interest of grand-
parents in maintaining relationships with their grandchildren is a pro-
tected liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
As Moore and other cases indicate, there is little reason to restrict these
rights to the nuclear family. From here, it is a short step to finding that,
in the absence of parents, due process entitles grandparents to a pre-
sumption of fitness and standing to obtain custody, which parents al-
ready enjoy. As the next Part illustrates, however, there is some resis-
tance to taking this next step.
II. CHALLENGES FOR GRANDPARENTS SEEKING
EXTENSION OF RIGHTS
The presumption of parental autonomy provides a useful con-
struct for finding due process protection for grandparent-grandchild
relationships where the grandparents fulfill parent-like roles. It also
serves, however, as a limitation on the ability of grandparents to assert
rights where the parents' rights have not yet been terminated due to
the almost absolute deference given to the decisions of fit parents.
Part II.A discusses the reluctance of some courts to extend the sub-
44 Id at 500, citing Moore, 431 US at 504.
45 Johnson, 310 F3d at 500. See also Drollinger, 552 F2d at 1227 n 6 ("The nuclear family
has traditionally constituted the unit afforded the protection of due process. We see no reason,
however, not to extend this guaranty to the grandfather-grandchild relationship.").
46 See Moore, 431 US at 506; Johnson, 310 F3d at 506; Drollinger, 552 F2d at 1227 (holding
that the conditions of a parent's probation order unconstitutionally interfered with a grandfa-
ther's right to care for his granddaughter). But see Troxel, 530 US at 67.
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stantive due process rights of the family to grandparents seeking cus-
tody of their grandchildren. Part II.B addresses the specific problem
of parental autonomy in further detail.
A. Failures in the Custody Context
Several courts have balked at the idea that grandparent-grandchild
relationships should enjoy any constitutional protection in cuslody
proceedings." They decline to extend Moore to cover other threats to
grandparent-grandchild relationships because they interpret the line
of cases beginning with Meyer v Nebraska' as guaranteeing only par-
ents' rights.49 The dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and White in
Moore foreshadow the arguments that are generally posed in opposi-
tion to finding a protected liberty interest in grandparents' relation-
ships with their grandchildren. Justice Stewart argued that the interest
"in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a suite of contiguous
rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise" to the level of a
personal interest "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Simi-
larly, Justice White stated that the desire to live with more than one
set of grandchildren "is hardly one of which it could be said that 'nei-
ther liberty nor justice could exist if [it] were sacrificed.' 5 However,
neither of these dissenting opinions closes the door to constitutional
protection for grandparents' rights in the custody context. Arguably,
the desire to direct the upbringing of one's grandchildren is of signifi-
cantly more importance and personal worth than the interest in shar-
ing an address.
Despite the room for recognition of grandparents' custody rights
under substantive due process left by even the dissenting opinions in
Moore, several courts-most noticeably the Ninth Circuit-have de-
clined to extend the recognition of fundamental rights to grandpar-
47 See Mullins v Oregon, 57 F3d 789, 797 (9th Cir 1995) ("[G]randparents qua grandpar-
ents have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the adoption of their children's off-
spring."); Gordon v Lowell, 95 F Supp 2d 264,269 (ED Pa 2000) (limiting due process protection
to parents); In re Adoption of Tompkins, 341 Ark 949, 20 SW3d 385,387 (2000) (rejecting a con-
stitutionally protected right to custody, adoption, or visitation for grandparents, concluding that
at common law grandparents had no such presumptive rights and so any rights for grandparents
must derive from statutes). But see Wilson v Family Service Division, 554 P2d 227,230-31 (Utah
1976) (holding that a grandmother had a vested interest in the custody and welfare of her grand-
child, entitling her to a hearing on her adoption petition before the agency placed the child for
adoption).
48 262 US 390 (1923).
49 See text accompanying notes 25-30.
50 Moore, 431 US at 537 (Stewart dissenting).
51 Id at 549 (White dissenting), quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319,326 (1937).
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ents. In Mullins v Oregon,'2 the Ninth Circuit determined that, al-
though grandparents may have a right to freedom from state interfer-
ence in their existing relationships with their grandchildren, they have
no right to create a new family unit "out of whole cloth." 3 Because the
Mullinses had only minimal contact with their grandchild prior to fil-
ing their adoption petition and essentially based their right to prefer-
ence solely on their biological connection, the court found that their
relationship did not warrant constitutional protection."
In Miller v California," the Ninth Circuit narrowed the window
for the application of parental rights protections even further, effec-
tively closing the gap left by Mullins for grandparents who enjoyed
something beyond mere biological ties. The court determined that
grandparents who had "de facto" parent status under state law and
who acted as the child's primary caregiver for a substantial period of
time had no protected liberty interest in the care of their grandchild."
The court gave the Millers no constitutional protection against a deci-
sion to restrict their visitation rights while their grandchildren were in
the care of child protective services. The broadness of the court's lan-
guage suggests an unwillingness to extend the constitutional protection
of parents' custody of children beyond existing family units and tradi-
tional parent-child bonds in any context.7 The court based this conclu-
sion in substantial part, however, on the fact that the children's mother
objected to the grandparents' visitation, distinguishing it from Moore.-'
It seems quite possible, therefore, that in cases where there is no con-
flict between the wishes of the parents and the grandparents, the in-
terests of grandparents could qualify for due process protection.
In an approach similar to that taken by many states, an Indiana
court conceded that grandparents may enjoy some constitutional
rights with respect to their grandchildren, but determined that rights
of grandparents "derive" from the rights of the parents, and so these
52 57 F3d 789 (9th Cir 1995).
53 Id at 794.
54 Id ("We have found no other authority supporting the proposition that a grandparent,
by virtue of genetic link alone, enjoys a fundamental liberty interest in the adoption of her grand-
children.") (emphasis added).
55 355 F3d 1172 (9th Cir 2004).
56 Id at 1175 (discussing California's "de facto parent" rule and declining to hold that this
established a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the rearing of children).
57 Id at 1175 ("While there is no question that parents have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in making decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children, we have
never held that any such right extends to grandparents.") (internal citations omitted).
58 See id at 1176 (distinguishing Moore on the grounds that the Millers' interests in this
case conflicted with the interests of the children's mother).
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rights were effectively terminated with the termination of parents' own
rights.59 However, the independent emotional bond between grand-
parents and grandchildren is often regarded as an independent inter-
est in other contexts.'° The termination of parents' rights due to unfit-
ness or abandonment does not always result in the termination of all
rights of the grandparents, as kinship foster care preference and grand-
parent visitation statutes indicate.6'
B. The Problem of Parental Autonomy
Cases such as Mullins and Miller demonstrate the obstacles fac-
ing grandparents' claims for constitutional protection of their interest
in assuming responsibility for their grandchildren. This Part will de-
scribe the ways in which the overriding protection of parental auton-
omy may make courts wary of extending grandparents' rights.2 Several
cases imply that, because of the strict deference to parental autonomy,
only those grandparents who do not attempt to usurp parental author-
59 See In re Adoption of I.K.E.W., 724 NE2d 245,249 & n 6 (Ind App 2000) (recognizing
that grandparents may have a liberty interest in the grandparent-grandchild relationship when
the relationship is essentially a custodial one, but stating that this interest does not exist in the
adoption context because the derivative rights of grandparents are extinguished by the termination
of the parents' rights). See also Indermark, Note, 26 Ga L Rev at 820-23 (cited in note 10) (de-
scribing the doctrine of derivative rights).
60 See, for example, Moore, 431 US at 504-05 (Powell) (plurality);Johnson, 310 F3d at 499-
500; Drollinger, 552 F2d at 1227.
61 See note 7. The importance of statutory evidence of national policy trends in substantive
due process cases was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v Texas, 539 US
558 (2003). As part of its analysis, the Court examined the number of states with similar laws to
illustrate changes since Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 1039 (1986), stating that "[tlhe 25 States with
laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce
their laws only against homosexual conduct" Lawrence, 539 US at 559. In addition to statutory
evidence of a desire to grant grandparents some rights that are not derivative of the parents'
rights, the common law of several states indicates that grandparents' rights may survive the
termination of the parents' rights. See Indermark, Note, 26 Ga L Rev at 788 n 5 (cited in note
10), citing Stevens v Shannon, 107 Pa Super 557,164 A 352,353-54 (1933) (holding that the right
to custody of minor grandchildren is corollary to the grandparent's duty to maintain grandchil-
dren if orphaned); Michelson v Superior Court, 41 Wash 2d 718, 251 P2d 603, 604-05 (1952)
(naming a grandparent the "natural guardian" of her grandchild when the child's parents have
died or have had their parental rights terminated). But see, for example, In re Kristy L., 47 Conn
Supp 273,787 A2d 679,685-87 (Super Ct 1999) (holding that grandparents did not have standing
to petition for custody of their grandchild since parental rights had been terminated); Suster v
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 314 Ark 92, 858 SW2d 122, 124 (1993) ("Because a
grandparent's rights are only derivative, they ... are subject to divestment when parental rights
are terminated.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 See, for example, Suster, 858 SW2d at 124. In denying a grandmother's right to intervene
in her granddaughter's adoption proceeding, the court stated, "To create new, [independently]
enforceable rights in grandparents could ... [cause] prospective adoptive parents [to] be less
inclined to assume that worthwhile role." Id.
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ity could ever receive priority in adoption proceedings6 Any conclu-
sion that grandparents have a constitutional right to direct the up-
bringing of their grandchildren therefore must be tempered by paren-
tal autonomy concerns. In custody contexts, typically the parents'
rights already have been terminated, and so the concern is less acute.
There is evidence, however, that parents' wishes for the child may still
receive some weight when the child is in state custody.6
The recent Supreme Court decision in Troxel reaffirmed the im-
portance of parental autonomy interests. In that case, a statute allow-
ing anyone to petition for visitation rights was deemed an unconstitu-
tional interference with the rights of the child's parent to direct her
child's upbringing.6 Although the grandparents in Troxel had enjoyed
a substantial relationship with the child in the past, a termination of
their visitation rights was held not to violate any constitutional right of
the grandparents."
Troxel does not end all inquiry into the question of whether grand-
parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in the society and custody
of their grandchildren. First, visitation poses very different risks than
custody. Visitation may potentially interfere with the parents' plan for
their child's upbringing by leading to the contradiction of the parents'
wishes or the transmission of confusing messages to the child. How-
ever, where adoption is at issue, the parent-child relationship has been
terminated, so the replacement of the parent with a grandparent leads
to no additional disruption in the child's life.
Troxel also did not address the possibility that grandparents might
possess a fundamental interest in their grandchildren that does not con-
63 See, for example, Ellis v Hamilton, 669 F2d 510, 513 (7th Cir 1982) (stating that where
grandchildren are in their parents' custody, grandparents probably do not have a liberty interest
in the society of their grandchildren); Navajo Nation v Superior Court, 47 F Supp 2d 1233,1239-
40 (ED Wash 1999) (holding that, where parents had voluntarily arranged for the adoption of
their child, the child's grandparents had no fundamental right to adopt). See also Troxel, 530 US
at 68; In re Parentage of C.A.M.A. v Appel, 154 Wash 2d 52, 109 P3d 405,413 (2005) (invalidating
a statute that gave grandparents the benefit of a presumption that visitation was in a child's best
interest because this presumption infringed on a fit parent's due process rights, and holding that
a showing of harm to the child from a failure to grant visitation was necessary). But see Harrold
v Collier, 2005 Ohio LEXIS 2241, *22 (upholding Ohio's nonparental visitation statute as applied
to a case where the grandparents demonstrated that visitation would be in the child's best inter-
ests and the parent's contrary wishes were just one, albeit weighty, factor in the court's best interests
analysis).
64 See Miller, 355 F3d at 1176 (holding that grandparents did not have a protected liberty
interest in visiting grandchildren in state custody where the agency and the parent agreed that
visitation should cease).
65 Troxel, 530 US at 67-69.
66 Id at 69.
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flict with the parents' wishes, or that the grandparent might effectively
stand in the shoes of the parent through an established caregiving re-
lationship with the parent's consent. Instead, Troxel stands for the much
more limited proposition that where grandparents' or others' wishes
conflict with the wishes of the parent, the court must defer to the par-
ent.67 The holding in Troxel might realistically inhibit the ability of in-
dividual grandparents to form substantial relationships with their grand-
children, but it does not preclude the finding of an interest in those
who are permitted access.
Where there is no suggestion that the parents of the child object
to the visitation, and the grandparents have a history of involvement
in the child's upbringing, the courts have been willing to invalidate
state and local laws that interfere with those relationships.6 Due proc-
ess protection for a grandparent's right to adopt her grandchildren can
be limited to situations where it would not compete with parental
rights.69 As shown in this Part, there are some obstacles to grandpar-
ents' assertion of a protected liberty interest in their relationships with
their grandchildren. The cases involving unwed fathers suggest, how-
ever, that these concerns are not insurmountable.
III. RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISTICS NECESSARY
FOR DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
This Part proposes a test for cases involving grandparents similar
to that applied to determine whether the interests of unwed biological
fathers deserve due process protection. The cases involving unwed
fathers' custody claims illustrate the narrow construction of parental
identity for due process protection in the context of child custody, and
67 Id at 68-69 ("So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the fam-
ily."). But see Harrold, 2005 Ohio LEXIS 2241 at *20-21 (stating that, despite the Troxel pre-
sumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, "the trial court's analysis of the
best interests of the child need not end once a parent has articulated his or her wishes").
68 See, for example, the post-Troxel case of Johnson, 310 F3d at 505-06, which held uncon-
stitutional a city ordinance that prohibited a drug offender grandmother from entering the area
where the mother lived, inhibiting the grandmother's ability to participate in the upbringing of
her grandchildren.
69 For an example of the way that substantive due process rights can be flexibly applied
within groups of people, see Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 127 (1989) (holding that the
biological father of a child born outside of wedlock does not have a fundamental liberty interest
in visitation rights where finding such an interest would result in the disruption of an existing
family unit).
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the careful weighing of interests that the analysis involves.'° This nar-
row construction of parental identity in custody contexts does not
necessarily exclude grandparents. Instead, in the absence of parents,
grandparents may have intimate bonds with the children and fill roles
equally deserving of parental autonomy as those protected in the con-
text of the nuclear family. This is particularly true if the grandparents
have a substantial relationship with the child, and if they assumed some
degree of responsibility for the child prior to filing an adoption peti-
tion. 1
Part III.A analyzes the importance of biology in the determina-
tion of parental due process rights and the trend towards de-emphasis
of the biological relationship. Part III.B discusses how the existence of
a substantial relationship with the child has become of determinative
importance in parental custody contexts and the ways in which that
same analysis can apply to grandparents. Finally, Part III.C addresses
competing interests in the custody context in an attempt to address
concerns that recognizing greater rights for grandparents could lead to
a ballooning of substantive due process protection for others2 or could
discourage other potential adoptive parents.
A. Biology
Relationships between grandparents and grandchildren often origi-
nate with a biological connection. As Lehr v Robertson7" holds, how-
ever, biology is not enough to entitle a relationship to constitutional
protection. 4 The reasons behind the established constitutional protec-
tion for family matters illustrate why this conclusion is necessary. The
family is entitled to freedom from state interference not as a means of
protecting mere ties of blood, but rather because it preserves emo-
70 See, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 657-58 (1972) (holding that the Due
Process Clause prohibits a presumption that an unwed father is per se "unfit," and that the father
must be afforded a hearing on fitness before his children are taken by the state).
71 See Smith v Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 842-
47 (1977) (comparing the foster family to the natural family to address whether foster parents
possess a protected liberty interest in their relationships with their foster children).
72 In the similar context of grandparents' visitation rights, the Supreme Court accepts a
similar argument. Troxel, 530 US at 67-69 (noting that under the Washington statute, "'[any
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time,' and the court may grant such
visitation rights whenever 'visitation may serve the best interest of the child').
73 463 US 248 (1983).
74 See id at 261-62.
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tional attachments and fosters education that prepares children for
future involvement in society."
Courts considering grandparents' adoption rights recognize this
general purpose behind substantive due process protection for family
matters and emphasize that biological links alone do not create a rela-
tionship that warrants constitutional protection.76 Instead, the impor-
tance of biology is that it tends to afford grandparents an opportunity
to develop a close relationship with their grandchildren.? As the
courts implicitly concede, biological links often serve as an inaccurate
proxy for the closeness of relationships, and step-grandparents or
adoptive grandparents may enjoy relationships equally, or perhaps
more, deserving of protection than those enjoyed by the natural grand-
parents of the child."
B. Substantial Relationship
As the unwed father cases and Mullins conclude, a biological re-
lationship does not, in itself, demonstrate the existence of a fundamen-
tal liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause.79 "[T]he
75 See Smith, 431 US at 844 ("[T]he importance of the familial relationship ... stems from
the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association."); Wisconsin v
Yoder, 406 US 205,231-33 (1972) ("The duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' ...
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship.").
76 See Mullins, 57 F3d at 794-95 (holding that where the biological grandparents seeking
adoption had only minimal contact with the child, a state action blocking their adoption did not
violate their substantive due process rights); Navajo Nation v Superior Court, 47 F Supp 2d 1233,
1241 (ED Wash 1999) (rejecting the claim that grandparents, by virtue of biology alone, enjoy a
fundamental liberty interest in the adoption of their grandchildren). See also In re Adoption of
H.M.C., 11 SW3d 81, 90 (Mo App 2000) ("[A] biological relationship to [a] child, by itself, does
not constitute the necessary 'interest' under [the rules of civil procedure] to require intervention.").
77 This idea follows from Lehr:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportu-
nity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contribu-
tions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not auto-
matically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
463 US at 262.
78 See id (emphasizing that the significance of the biological connection between a natural
father and his offspring is that it offers him an opportunity to develop a relationship with his
offspring). See also Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 129 (1989) (Scalia) (plurality) (explain-
ing that where a child is born into a marital family, the natural father's opportunity to pursue a
relationship with his child is no longer unique, and the state may prefer the relationship of the
husband over that of the biological father).
79 Lehr, 463 US at 261 (holding that a mere biological link is insufficient to afford a father's
relationship with his child constitutional protection, but where an unwed father participates in
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importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in promot-
ing a way of life through the instruction of children," rather than
through the mere fact of natural parenthood.8n Evidence of a substan-
tial relationship between grandparents and grandchildren thus pro-
vides a more promising basis for recognizing substantive due process
protection for a particular family tie than does the biological link
alone. A substantial relationship implies that emotional attachments
have developed and that the grandparents have had some involve-
ment in the child's upbringing, which together appear to meet the
general purposes of the constitutional protection for familial bonds as
illustrated by the unwed fathers cases.
Cases such as Stanley v Illinois8 show the greater status conferred
on biological fathers with a demonstrated history of involvement in
the lives of their children as compared with cases where the claim to
preservation of the relationship rests on biology alone.8 In cases
where the natural father had maintained a substantial relationship
with his children, the courts have deemed state interference with that
relationship unconstitutional.83 The only exceptions to this general
consensus have arisen where another substantial relationship of equal
significance in the child's life exists and state law favors that other
relationship. ' In Michael H. v Gerald D.,8 the Court found the interest
the rearing of his child, "his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause"). See also Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380, 414 (1979)
("[I]f and when one develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled
to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process.") (Stevens dissenting).
80 Smith, 431 US at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 405 US 645, 651 (1972) ("The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.") (emphasis added).
82 See Lehr, 463 US at 257-58 (emphasizing the linkage between parental duty and paren-
tal right); Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246,256 (1978) (holding that the adoption of a child by the
mother's new husband over the father's objections did not violate the father's Due Process rights
where he never legitimated or visited the child prior to the filing of the adoption petition).
83 See Caban, 441 US at 394 (invalidating a statute requiring the mother's consent when an
unwed father with a substantial relationship wishes his partner to adopt his children, with no
similar requirement when the mother's partner wishes to adopt); Stanley, 405 US at 658 (holding
that the state cannot constitutionally presume unfit a biological father and caregiver). But see
Michael H., 491 US at 130 (holding against a biological father when the mother's husband was
regarded as the child's father since birth because a state legitimacy presumption favored the
husband and both putative fathers had a substantial relationship with the child).
84 See Michael H., 491 US at 130. Although the Michael H. plurality deemphasized the due
process threads running through cases such as Stanley and Caban, five justices refused to fore-
close the possibility that a natural father might have a constitutionally protected interest in his
relationship with a child whose mother is married to someone else at the child's birth. Four
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of the biological father less important than that of the husband of the
child's mother, who had acted as, and had been legally presumed to be,
the child's father since birth.8 Absent such potential for extreme dis-
ruption of the child's accustomed family life, "the relationship of love
and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to
constitutional protection.""
Grandparents and unwed fathers occupy similar positions in a
child's life. Given this similarity, the cases determining that unwed
fathers who have a substantial relationship with their children have a
protected liberty interest in maintaining that relationship support a
finding that grandparents have a constitutionally protected interest in
adopting grandchildren with whom they have a substantial relation-
ship. Such a conclusion draws further support from grandparents' suc-
cess in other contexts.8 Courts have determined that grandparents
may not be deprived of their freedom to associate with and participate
in the upbringing of their grandchildren. These decisions bear particu-
lar promise for a similar constitutional protection of the greater right
to direct the child's upbringing through adoption. For example, in
Summers v Wulffenstein," the Utah Supreme Court determined that
where parental rights had been terminated, a grandparent had a lib-
erty interest in the custody and welfare of her grandchildren for the
purposes of due process analysis. In Ellis v Hamilton," the Seventh
Circuit provided further indication of courts' receptiveness to due
process protection for grandparents' adoption rights in the context of
a substantial relationship. The case implied that the state's action in
taking the child out of the care of her grandmother, without first al-
lowing her to adopt the child, could have violated due process had the
state not provided reasonable remedies."
justices further agreed that a natural father with a substantial relationship has a liberty interest
in his relationship with his child.
85 491 US 110 (1989).
86 Id at 129 (holding that where "the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural
father's unique opportunity [to develop a relationship with the child] conflicts with the similarly
unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to
give categorical preference to the latter").
87 Lehr, 463 US at 258, citing Moore, 431 US 494.
88 See Moore, 431 US at 498-99; Johnson, 310 F3d at 501; Drollinger, 552 F2d at 1226-27.
89 616 P2d 608 (Utah 1980).
90 Id at 610 (characterizing the grandparent's "'dormant or inchoate right or interest in the
custody and welfare' of [the] children" as a liberty interest).
91 669 F2d 510 (7th Cir 1982).
92 Id at 513 ("[W]e are reluctant to conclude that a great-aunt, an adoptive grandmother,
and a de facto mother and father all rolled up into one does not have a liberty interest suffi-
ciently like that of a parent."). Cases where preexisting participation in the child's life is evident
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One might argue that the existence of a substantial relationship
alone sufficiently ensures the protection of grandparents' interests
without any need for reference to the Constitution. If grandparents
have such a relationship with their grandchildren, then they will natu-
rally know of any actions affecting that relationship before they occur.
Foster care, however, often disrupts grandparents' relationships with
their grandchildren, and foster relationships may enjoy statutory pref-
erence over grandparental relationships. The fact that the grandpar-
ents' relationship can be taken into account during a best interests of
the child inquiry matters little if grandparents are unaware that any
custody actions are taking place, or if they lack any hope of success
due to a preference scheme disfavoring them.
C. Competing Adoption Interests
Courts have been wary of accepting arguments for quasi-parental
due process rights asserted by grandparents. Several courts insist that
extending protection to grandparents would require the extension of
constitutional protection to other relatives. This extension, the courts
find, would result in an ever-expanding number of competing adop-
tion petitions and would unduly inhibit the search for permanent, nur-
turing homes for children. 3 This Part addresses both of these concerns
by analyzing the ways in which grandparents' interests differ from
those of other relatives and foster parents.
1. Competition between grandparents and other relatives.
There are some indications that grandparents' rights should be
viewed as superior to other relational interests. Statutes conferring
privileges specifically on grandparents, such as court-ordered visita-
tion," intervention rights in certain custody proceedings,9' and, in at
also partially dispel the fear that an extension of due process protection to grandparents would
bestow a right "to create an entirely new family unit out of whole cloth." Mullins, 57 F3d at 794
(holding that the "negative right to be free of governmental interference in an already existing
family relationship" does not apply to biological grandparents who had only minimal prior con-
tact with the child they sought to adopt).
93 See Mullins, 57 F3d at 796 (stating that the creation of rights in grandparents would
burden the process of placing children). See also id at n 62.
94 See, for example, Tex Family Code Ann § 153.433 (West 2002) (granting grandparents
reasonable access to a grandchild when one of the parents is absent or unfit and at least one
natural parent still has parental rights); 755 ILCS 5/11-7.1(a) (West 1998) (stating that the court
"shall" grant grandparents visitation rights when the parents of the child are deceased, but re-
stricting visitation orders for other relatives to the court's discretion).
95 See Mo Rev Stat § 211.177.1 (granting grandparents the right to intervene in custody
proceedings unless the judge determines such intervention is not in the best interest of the child).
1492 [72:1473
2005] A Constitutional Analysis of Grandparents' Custody Rights
least one state, limited preference in custody proceedings,6 indicate
that legislators in several states assume that grandparent-grandchild
relationships are distinct from aunt-niece, cousin-cousin, or other rela-
tionships with relatives."
Cases such as Moore and Johnson also provide evidence of this
recognition of the traditionally important role that grandparents have
occupied in the family and distinguish them from other relatives.'
Both law and tradition treat grandparents' interests in their grand-
children as more important than the interests of other relatives or in-
terested parties. Grandparents tend to perceive themselves as playing
unique roles in the lives of their grandchildren." For example, many
grandparents derive meaning from their roles as imparters of wisdom
and indulgent parent-like figures." Grandparents also often value grand-
parenthood as a means of "life review."'' Similarly, grandchildren tend
to view their grandparents as distinct from other relatives.n Grand-
parents may take on various roles in children's minds-as a conduit
for tradition and learning, or as a sort of magical and respected elder.'°3
Most importantly, grandchildren often view the grandparent as a sort
of higher level parent, providing a supportive safety net and fulfilling
a similar nurturing role."' Children deprived of these relationships
often feel less emotional security and a weaker cultural and historical
96 See RI Gen Laws § 15-7-5(b)(2) (2003) (conferring a preference on "the natural parents
of the child and his or her spouse or one of the grandparents of the child").
97 But see note 7 for statutes that provide a more general preference for care by relatives
of the child.
98 See Moore, 431 US at 504 ("Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally...
deserving of constitutional recognition.") (emphasis added); Johnson, 310 F3d at 500 (explaining
that the right to participate in the upbringing of one's grandchild occupies a high position in
society's "hierarchy of values" and is of a more fundamental nature than the right to visit one's
nieces and nephews).
99 See Crystal C. Ramirez Barranti, The Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship: Family
Resource in an Era of Voluntary Bond, 34 Fain Rel 343, 344-45 (1985), citing H.Q. Kivnick,
Grandparenthood: An Overview of Meaning and Mental Health, 22 Gerontologist 59, 59 (1982)
(discussing the dimensions of grandparenthood).
100 Barranti, 34 Fam Rel at 344-45 (cited in note 99).
101 Id.
102 Id at 348, citing A. Kornhaber and K.L. Woodward, Grandparents/Grandchildren: The
Vital Connection (Anchor 1981) (discussing the "modes of attachment which existed between
grandchildren and grandparents").
103 Barranti, 34 Fam Rel at 348 (cited in note 99).
104 Id.
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identity.'5 These findings do not show that children may not develop
similar significant relationships with other relatives. Constitutional
protection of grandparent-grandchild relationships, however, need not
be denied merely because it could logically extend to other potentially
worthy familial relationships.
2. Competition between grandparents and foster parents.
Grandparents are traditionally regarded as occupying a place im-
mediately below parents in the family hierarchy with respect to chil-
dren.6 When people outside the family, such as foster parents, act in a
parental role, it is less clear that grandparents with a substantial rela-
tionship with the child will still enjoy the highest priority in adoption
proceedings. Some states' adoption statutes grant foster parents pref-
erence while according no such preference to relatives of the child.°u
Furthermore, because courts have placed little emphasis on biology in
determining the rights of unwed fathers, it seems they should also of-
ten subordinate grandparents' rights to those of foster parents by de-
nying any constitutional protection for the grandparent-grandchild
relationship.
There is support, however for the idea that kinship is important,
insofar as it creates differing expectations of insulation and protection
from state interference. Foster parents are creatures of state law and
are essentially contracted caregivers."° Where a claimed interest "de-
rives from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the State, it
is appropriate to ascertain from state law the expectations and enti-
tlements of the parties."'0 In other words, unless state law contains
provisions explicitly preferring foster parents over others in adoption
proceedings, foster parents cannot argue that they have been deprived
of a fundamental liberty interest when the state interferes with or
dismantles the foster family." The nature of the foster parent-child
relationship thus gives foster parents no protected liberty interest in
the custody of their foster children."' Since the grandparent-grandchild
105 See id at 346-48 (discussing the consequences of a nonexistent grandparent/grandchild
relationship).
106 See Johnson, 310 F3d at 500.
107 See note 14.
108 See Smith, 431 US at 845 (contrasting the foster family and the natural family).
109 Id at 845-46.
110 Id.
111 Id at 846 ("[T]he limited recognition accorded to the foster family by the [state] statutes
and the contracts executed by the foster parents argued against any but the most limited consti-
tutional 'liberty' in the foster family.").
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relationship is not a creature of state law, there is no reason to assume
that grandparents should be similarly constrained. Grandparents also
have a superior claim to unrelated foster parents because, historically,
the Supreme Court's family and parental rights holdings have in-
volved biological families."
Despite foster parents' lack of a fundamental liberty interest in
the families they contract to create, foster parents' adoption petitions
often succeed over those of grandparents. These cases could indicate
that grandparents never possess a fundamental liberty interest in the
right to direct the upbringing of their grandchildren. A deeper reading
reveals that these cases tend to occur in contexts where the grandpar-
ents either have a weak relationship with the child,"' or where the best
interests of the child indicate that the foster parents would provide a
more suitable home, particularly where the child has lived with the
foster family for some time or where other family members are the
reason for the child's removal."'
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE PROTECTION
OF GRANDPARENTS' CUSTODY INTERESTS
Grandparents often assume traditional parental roles with the
parents' explicit or implicit consent. For example, grandparents fre-
quently act as babysitters, or grandparents may take grandchildren into
their homes when parents are not able to provide adequate care."' In
cases where grandparents have formed these relationships with their
grandchildren, they deserve protection from state interference, as re-
quired by the Due Process Clause. This Part suggests the form that pro-
tection for grandparents' substantive rights should take.
112 See Lofton v Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F3d 804, 812 (11th Cir
2004) (noting that the Supreme Court's opinions have often stressed that the usual understand-
ing of "family" implies a biological relationship).
113 See In re Adoption of I.K.E.W., 724 NE2d 245,249 (Ind App 2000) (explaining that a liberty
interest only exists where the grandparent-grandchild relationship is essentially a custodial one).
114 See In re Adoption of C.D., 313 I11 App 3d 301, 729 NE2d 553, 556, 558-59, 563 (2000)
(holding that the lower court's finding in the foster parents' favor was not an abuse of discretion
and did not violate the grandparents' due process rights where the grandparents had limited
contact with the child and the child's uncle had previously subjected her to abuse).
115 According to recent United States Census figures, 5.8 million grandparents, or 3.6 per-
cent of the population over age thirty, live with grandchildren under age eighteen. Of these
grandparents, 42 percent serve as the primary caregivers for their grandchildren. United States
Census Bureau, Grandparents Living with Grandchildren: 2000 1 (2003), online at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-31.pdf (visited Aug 8, 2005).
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A. Notice
If a grandparent's interest in adoption falls under the protection
of the Due Process Clause, that protection warrants a requirement to
notify grandparents whenever adoption petitions or custody orders
contrary to their interests are filed. 6 This notice requirement could be
limited to situations where the child is no longer in the parents' care
and where the grandparents appear to have established a substantial
relationship with the child. Courts could easily ascertain the existence
of such a relationship by a brief interview with the child, or by an in-
quiry into the circumstances of the parental rights termination. Much
as the notification and consent of unwed fathers generally is re-
quired,"7 grandparents who have assumed responsibility for the child
in the past should be entitled to notification of custody proceedings.
As some statutes do with unwed fathers,"8 this notice requirement can
be waived to avoid unduly hampering the foster care and adoption
process if the grandparents and the child have no evident recent or
ongoing ties."9
B. Preference
More significantly, due process would also require that grandpar-
ents' adoption petitions receive preferential consideration where grand-
parents can demonstrate the necessary relationship criteria. First, the
preference would ensure that grandparents have standing to object to
foster care orders that are contrary to their interests. Second, the pref-
erence could require the court to weigh more heavily grandparents'
interests in caring for the child over the alternative of putting the child
into foster care.
116 For an analysis of grandparents' procedural due process rights under Mathews v El-
dridge, 424 US 319 (1976), see Kotkin, Note, 13 Hofstra L Rev at 388-405 (cited in note 8).
117 See note 83.
118 See RI Gen Laws § 15-7-5(b)(2) (allowing adoption without consent of the noncustodial
parent on a showing of failure to pay child support or similar factors); NY Dom Rel Law § 111.2
(McKinney 1999) (maintaining that consent of an unwed father is necessary if he has had "sub-
stantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child"); Cal Fam Code § 8604 (2005) (stat-
ing that both birth parents have the right of consent unless one fails to maintain contact and pay
child support).
119 As stated in Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314-15 (1950),
the notice required for the satisfaction of procedural due process is "notice reasonably calculated
... to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.... But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the
case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied." Id. A
similar rule of reason can be applied in this case by examining whether petitioners made all reason-
able efforts to ascertain if a grandparent with a substantial relationship to the child existed.
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Such a pre-foster care preference would avert many conflicts be-
tween grandparents and foster parents, while minimizing disruption in
the child's life. This preference would also protect grandparents' sig-
nificant liberty interest in the companionship of their grandchildren
and the power to direct their upbringing in the absence of parents. The
preference could also enhance grandparents' abilities to petition for
visitation if their grandchildren are placed in foster care. Currently,
grandparents' interests are at their most vulnerable once the child is
placed with strangers to the family.0 If, however, courts recognize a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in grandparent-grandchild
relationships, grandparents will be guaranteed standing and their peti-
tions will bear more weight in custody and visitation disputes.
Preference in custody proceedings would not guarantee that grand-
parents will prevail in every case in which they assert an interest.
Rather, the best interests of the child analysis would continue to serve
as a restriction on grandparents' rights, just as the best interests of the
child can now override parents' rights in cases of neglect or abuse.
Instead, the proposed adoption preference for grandparents would
merely establish a rebuttable presumption of their fitness as adoptive
parents and custodians.
This proposed preference may seem like a small step for grand-
parents' rights, for it says nothing about how a court must weigh their
interests after the child has entered into foster care for an extended
period of time. The preference, however, can avert substantial disloca-
tion for the child by ensuring that grandparents have access to the
courts before the child enters foster care. Situations in which state law
restricts grandparents' access to their grandchildren in foster care, and
the uncertain fate of grandparents' interests in an adoption competi-
tion with foster parents, illustrate the need for a pre-foster care pref-
erence as a matter of constitutional right. State statutes and policies
that prefer grandparents or kinship foster care further support the
preferential approach."' The existence of this pattern among the states
illustrates the traditional importance placed on kinship care arrange-
ments, and more generally on grandparent-grandchild relationships.
The Supreme Court has emphasized such legislative evidence in its
recent cases, which indicates a greater chance of success for recogni-
120 See, for example, Miller, 355 F3d at 1176 (holding that grandparents had no substantive due
process right to visit their grandchildren in state care, nor did their status as "de facto parents" under
California state law give them any more than the right to appear in the dependency proceeding).
121 See note 7.
1497
The University of Chicago Law Review
tion of grandparents' rights in spite of the Court's general reluctance
to expand the scope of substantive due process."
C. Impact of Notice and Preference Requirements
Although due process protection of grandparents' adoption rights
provides no guarantees that grandparents' custody petitions will always
be successful, the protection would ensure that grandparents-whom
many cases, statutes, and traditions regard as uniquely important in a
child's life-are not separated from their grandchildren by state action
without good reason and adequate deliberation. The protection applies
in a narrow set of circumstances, preventing the severance of existing
relationships and family units rather than automatically deferring to
grandparents simply because of their position in the family tree.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the essential importance
and constitutional protection of the right to direct the upbringing of
children. hese cases have generally defined this right in terms of the
parent-child relationship; however, there are significant indications that
it can apply equally to grandparents when they assume a similar role in
inculcating values and providing for the child's physical and emotional
needs. The autonomy rights of parents strictly circumscribe the scope of
any right grandparents possess. In situations where the parents are un-
available or unfit, however, and grandparents have previously enjoyed a
role in the child's life, state action should not interfere with that rela-
tionship unless its continuance is contrary to the child's best interests.
Grandparents, traditionally regarded as second-level parents and
often charged with the care of grandchildren, deserve notice and pref-
erence in custody proceedings concerning their grandchildren, if they
have assumed a parent-like role in the child's life. Statutes that fail to
prefer kinship or grandparent care over foster care, or that fail to re-
122 See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 559-60 (2003) (invalidating a Texas statute criminal-
izing homosexual sodomy and stating that "our laws and traditions of the past half century ...
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives"); Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 728 (1997) ("The
history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one
of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to
conclude that the asserted 'right' ... is not a fundamental liberty interest."). See also Moore, 431
US at 503 ("[Tihe Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because [it] is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
123 See notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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quire foster parents to notify grandparents of an intention to adopt,
unconstitutionally curtail this right. Unless the overarching require-
ments of the best interests of the child dictate otherwise, these grand-
parents' interests should enjoy preference in an evaluation of compet-
ing petitions for adoption by strangers to the family.
The recognition of a fundamental liberty interest in the custody
and care of grandchildren does not preclude the success of all other
potentially qualified candidates in adoption proceedings. It merely en-
sures that states will give grandparents with substantial relationships
with their grandchildren a sufficient opportunity to voice their desire to
adopt and to have their important familial ties and family-specific bene-
fits adequately considered.
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